Cleaned up sendfiles(1) man page just a bit.

[nmh] / docs / historical / trusted.txt

                                 Design  of  the  TTI  Prototype

                                         Trusted  Mail  Agent


                                             Marshall T. Rosey

                                               David J. Farber

                                            Stephen T. Walker



                                                  Abstract


               The design of the TTI  prototype Trusted Mail Agent (TMA)

               is discussed.  This agent interfaces between two entities:  a key

               distribution  center  (KDC)  and  a  user  agent  (UA).  The  KDC

               manages keys for the encryption of text messages, which two

               subscribers to a key distribution service (KDS) may exchange.

               The TMA is independent of any underlying message transport

               system.


               Subscribers  to  the  KDC  are  known  by  unique  identifiers,

               known as IDs.  In addition to distributing keys, the KDC also

               offers  a  simple  directory  lookup  service,  in  which  the  "real-

               world" name of a subscriber may be mapped to an ID, or the

               inverse mapping may be performed.


               This  document  details  three  software  components:   first_,  a

               prototype  key  distribution  service,  which  has  been  running

               in  a  TCP/IP  environment  since  December,  1984;  second____,  a

               prototype trusted mail agent; and, third___, modifications to an

               existing UA, the Rand MH Message Handling system, which

               permit interaction with the prototype TMA.



________________________________________
y All three authors are with Trusted Technologies, Incorporated, POB 45, Glenwood, MD 21738,

USA. Telephone: 301/854-6889. In addition, Professor Farber is with the University of Delaware.
\f

                                 Design  of  the  TTI  Prototype

                                         Trusted  Mail  Agent



Introduction

       Initially, a brief model of a user community employing a trusted mail service

is introduced.  Following this introduction, a prototype system is described which

attempts to meet the needs of a user community.  Finally, open issues are discussed,

which are currently not satisfied by the prototype system or its model of operation.


       Two  or  more  entities,  called  users,  wish  to  communicate  in  a  secure

environment.  Depending  on  their  available  resources,  different  levels  of  security

are possible.  At the extreme, two parties with substantial resources may wish to

communicate in a fashion which prevents any third parties, known as adversaries,

from  observing  their  communication.   At  this  level,  not  only  is  an  adversary

unable  to  capture  the  communication  for  analysis,  but  in  fact,  the  adversary  is

unaware  that  any  communication  is  occurring  at  all.  In  most  applications,  this

level of security is prohibitively expensive.  A more economic method is to translate

messages into a form which is useless to an adversary and then to communicate

those messages on an insecure medium.


       This latter method requires the two users to have some sort of key with which

to "lock" the plaintext into ciphertext when transmitting,  and then to "unlock"

the ciphertext back into useful form when receiving.  Hence, there are two central

issues to deal with:  first_, keys must be generated, distributed, and maintained in

a secure fashion;  and, second____, the keys must be "intricate" enough so that sense

can't be made out of the ciphertext without knowledge of the key.  The first part

is  handled  by  a  key  distribution  center  (KDC),  which  maintains  a  list  of  users

and a set of keys for each pair of users.  The second part relies on sophisticated

encryption  and  decryption  algorithms.  It  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper  to

describe cryptographic techniques in detail.  For a detailed survey of this area, the

reader should consult [VVoyd83].


       In  the  context  of  our  discussion  (using  the  terminology  of  [X.400]),  the

medium used to transport is supplied by a message transport system (MTS), which

is composed of one or more message transport agents (MTAs).  Usually, the entire

MTS  is  distributed  in  nature,  and  not  under  a  single  administrative  entity;  in

contrast, an MTA is usually controlled by a single administration and resides in a

particular domain.  At every end-point in the medium, a user agent (UA) acts on

behalf of a user and interfaces to a local MTA. This model is briefly summarized in

Figure 1.



 Copyright fcl1985, IFIP TC-6                                                                                       1
\f Reprinted from Proceedings, Second International Symposium on Computer Message Systems, 1985                2
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________



                UA                                                                                UA



   POSTING                                                                                            RECEIPT



                                                        MTS



               MTA                  MTA                  : : :                : : :              MTA

                                                              RELAYING



                                                    Figure 1

_______________________________________________The_MTS_Model__________________________________________________________



       A message, in our context, consists of two parts:  the headers and the body.

The  headers  are  rigorously  structured;  they  contain  addressing  information  and

other  forms  useful  to  a  UA.  The  body  is  freely  formatted  and  is  usually  not

meaningful to a UA.


       When  a  message  is  sent  from  one  user  to  another,  the  following  activities

occur:  The originating user indicates to the UA the address of the recipient;  the

UA  then  posts  the  message  through  a  posting  slot  to  an  MTA,  which  involves

a  posting  protocol  in  which  the  validity  of  the  address  and  the  syntax  of  the

message  are  considered.  Upon  successful  completion  of  the  protocol,  the  MTA

accepts responsibility for delivering the message, or if delivery fails, to inform the

originating user of the failure.  The MTA then decides if it can deliver the message

directly  to  the  recipient;  if  so,  it  delivers  the  message  through  a  delivery  slot  to

the recipient's UA, using a delivery protocol.  If not, it contacts an adjacent MTA,

closer to the recipient, and negotiates its transfer (using a protocol similar to the

posting protocol).  This process repeats until an MTA is able to deliver the message,

or an MTA determines that the message can't be delivered.  In this latter case, a

failure notice is sent to the originating user.


       It is important to note that there are two mappings which occur here.  The

first, which is performed implicitly by the originating user, maps the name of the

recipient into the recipient's address; the second, which is performed explicitly by

the MTS, maps the address of the recipient into a route to get from the originator's

MTA to the recipient's MTA. These mappings are depicted in Figure 2.


       Obviously, there is no guarantee that the MTS can be made secure, in any

sense of the word.  This is particularly true if it is under several administrations.

Regardless  of  the  number  of  administrations  in  the  MTS,  this  problem  quickly
\f Reprinted from Proceedings, Second International Symposium on Computer Message Systems, 1985                3
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________



         user                                                                                           user



            name   ! address



          UA                                                                                            UA



                                                        MTS
            address   ! route



         MTA                    MTA                      : : :                   : : :                 MTA



                                                    Figure 2

______________________________________Mappings_in_the_MTS_model_______________________________________________________



degenerates to a problem of Byzantine generals[LLamp82].  Further, trying to secure

each MTA in the path that a message travels is equally questionable.


       To  support  secure  communications  in  this  environment,  a  new  entity,  the

trusted mail agent (TMA) is introduced into our model.  A solution is to have the

UA interact with this entity both when posting a message and when taking delivery

of a message.  The UA first contacts a TMA to encrypt the body of the message for

the recipient, prior to pushing it through the posting slot.  Upon receipt from the

destination MTA, the UA examines the message and contacts the TMA to decipher

the body of the message from the source.  An overview of the relationship between

the standard MTS model and the augmentations made for the Trusted Mail1  system

is shown in Figure 3.


       To  achieve  these  tasks,  the  TMA  interacts  with  a  key  distribution  service

(KDS), which manages keys between pairwise users.  At this point, a third mapping

takes place:  the UA must be able to map addresses into the identifier(s) by which

the  originator  and  recipient  are  known  by  the  TMA  and  KDS.  These  identifiers

are  known  as  KDS  IDs,  or  simply  IDs.  Usually,  a  fourth  mapping  also  occurs,

________________________________________
1  Trusted Mail is a trademark of Trusted Technologies, Incorporated.
\f Reprinted from Proceedings, Second International Symposium on Computer Message Systems, 1985                4
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________



          UA                    TMA                     KDS                     TMA                     UA



                                                        MTS



         MTA                    MTA                      : : :                   : : :                 MTA



                                                    Figure 3

____________________________________Modifications_to_the_MTS_model____________________________________________________



which maps the ID of a user into the name of a user.  In our context, there is an

exact one-to-one mapping between the name of a user and the ID of that user.  In

contrast,  there may be a one-to-many mapping between the name of a user and

that user's address in the MTS. Further, there are usually many different routes

which a message may traverse when going from an originating user to a recipient

user.


       The TMA is said to be trusted because it can be relied on to perform only

those  actions  specifically  requested  by  the  user.   In  the  context  of  this  paper,

this  means,  given  proper  construction  and  maintenance  of  the  TMA,  that  the

software will communicate with the KDC in some secure fashion to negotiate key

relationships and that it will not disclose those key relationships to other parties.

Furthermore, the body of mail messages exchanged between users which employ a

trusted mail agent will be unintelligible to other parties.  Finally, a recipient of a

message receives authenticated information from the trusted mail agent as to the

identify of the sender.


       Hence, when each user employs a TMA, end-to-end encryption occurs at the

UA level (to avoid any problems with malicious MTAs).2  Any adversary listening

in on the MTS, may observe messages, but make no sense out of them (other than

rudimentary traffic analysis).  Note, however, that since the medium itself is not

secure, an adversary may still introduce new messages, corrupt messages, or remove


________________________________________
2  Note that in the scope of this system, the end-points are the user agents, not the hosts they reside

on. In fact, it may very well be the case that the user agent and the local message transport agent
do not reside on the same host.
\f Reprinted from Proceedings, Second International Symposium on Computer Message Systems, 1985                5


messages, as they traverse the MTS. In the first two cases, however, the recipient

would be suspicious because the adversary lacks the encrypting key employed by

the source user.  In the third case, the source user can retransmit the message after

a suitable time.  Of course, there is no built-in retransmission policy _ this aspect

depends on the user's sending mail and is beyond the scope of the system.


       It  is  important  to  understand  the  target  community  for  the  Trusted  Mail

system  described  herein.  In  particular,  the  TMA  is  intended  for  a  commercial

and  not  a  military  environment.   This  distinction  is  important,  since  it  is  the

fundamental assumption of this paper that the latter community has much stricter

requirements  than  the  former.  Because  of  this,  the  prototype  system  is  able  to

make certain simplifying assumptions which permit it to operate in a mode which

is less secure than military applications would permit.  Although these issues are

explored in greater detail at the end of the paper, for the moment recall that, like

most qualities, trustedness is not absolute:  there are varying degrees of trustedness,

and as a system becomes more trusted, it becomes more expensive, in some sense,

to operate and maintain.


       It is perhaps instructive at this point to consider why the introduction of a key

distribution center is appropriate in this environment,  and why the fundamental

assumption that trusted mail agents do not directly communicate with each other

is  necessary.  Although  a  user  agent  is  able  to  converse  with  the  local  message

transport agent in real-time, it is frequently not able to communicate with other

user agents in real-time.  Furthermore, considering the vast problems and overhead

of trying to establish secure communications from "scratch" (a problem far beyond

the scope of this paper), it is would not be a good idea to try and communicate

key relationships with other user agents, even if it were always possible to do so.

In  addition,  by  separating  the  trusted  aspects  of  the  message  transport  system

from the system itself, many other advantages can be seen.  These are presented in

greater detail at the end of the paper.


       The discussion thus far has considered only a single recipient.  In practice, a

user might wish to send to several others, using a different key for each.  Hence each

copy of the message is encrypted differently, depending on the particular recipient

in question.  Note that this has the effect of un-bundling message transfer in the

MTS, as advanced MTAs tend to keep only a single copy of the message for any

number of recipients in order to save both cpu, disk, and I/O resources.


       For example, in some existing mail systems, if a message was sent to n users

on a remote system, then the n addresses would be sent from the source MTA to

the remote MTA along with one copy of the message.  Upon delivery, the remote

MTA would deliver a copy to each of the n recipients, but the virtual wire between

the source MTA and the recipient MTA was burdened with only one copy of the

message.  But in a secure environment, since a different key is used by the source
\f Reprinted from Proceedings, Second International Symposium on Computer Message Systems, 1985                6


user when communicating with each of the n recipients, n different messages will

be posted with the local MTA, and the advantages of recipient bundling are lost.


       Along  these  lines  however,  private  discussion  groups  may  wish  to  avoid

this  problem  by  establishing  access  to  a  single  ID  for  their  use.  In  this  case,  a

subscriber  to  the  KDS  may  actually  have  more  than  one  ID,  one  for  "personal"

use and one for each discussion group.  The appropriate ID is used when posting

messages to the discussion group.  Naturally the administrative policy for deciding

who is allowed to use the KDS ID of a discussion group is left to the moderator

of  the  group.  Observant  readers  will  note  that  this  vastly  decreases  the  aspect

of  secure  communications  for  the  discussion  group.   This  method  is  suggested

as a compromise which permits the bundling of messages for multiple recipients

to  reduce  MTS  traffic.   The  price  is  high  however,  as  a  compromise  on  behalf

of any member of the discussion group compromises the entire group.  For large

discussion groups and a bandwidth limited MTS, this price may be worth paying.

The prototype implementation of the TMA supports multiple recipients but not

multiple KDS IDs.


       Having described this environment for communication, the designs of a KDS

and  TMA  which  form  the  heart  of  the  TTI  Trusted  Mail  system  are  discussed.

The  prototype  system  was  developed  on  a  VAX3 -11/780  running  4.2bsd  UNIX4 .

The system is based on the ansi draft[FIKM] for financial key management,  but

diverges somewhat in operation owing to the differences between the electronic mail

(CBMS) and electronic funds (EFT) environments.  Note however that the ansi

data encryption algorithm[DEA, FIPS46] is used in the current implementation.  A

public-key cipher system was not considered as the basis for the prototype since,

to the authors' knowledge, an open standard for a public-key system has yet to be

adopted by the commercial community.  In contrast, the ansi draft for financial key

management appears to be receiving wide support from the commercial community.


       In the description that follows, a large number of acronyms are employed to

denote commonly used terms.  In order to aid the reader, these are summarized in

Table 1.



The Key Distribution Service

       The prototype version of the KDS was designed to provide key distribution

services  for  user  agents  under  both  the  same  or  different  administrations.  As  a

result,  the  means  by  which  a  trusted  mail  agent  connects  to  a  key  distribution

server is quite flexible.  For example,  the prototype system supports connections

via standard terminal lines, dial-ups (e.g., over a toll-free 800 number), UNIX pipes,

and  over  TCP  sockets[IP, TCP].  In  the  interests  of  simplicity,  for  the  remainder

of this paper, a TCP/IP model of communication is used.  Initially, a server on a

________________________________________
3  VAX is a trademark of Digital Equipment Corporation.
4  UNIX is a trademark of AT&T Bell Laboratories.
\f Reprinted from Proceedings, Second International Symposium on Computer Message Systems, 1985                7
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
              ______________________________________________________________________________________________

              __Abbrev.________________________________Term_____________________________Context_______________

              _    CBC         _ Cipher Block Chaining                                 _    DES        _
              _   CBMS         _ Computer Based Message System                         _               _
              _    CKD         _ Key Distribution Center                               _    EFT        _
              _    CKS         _ Checksumming                                          _    DES        _
              _    CSM         _ Cryptographic Service Message                         _               _
              _    DEA         _ Data Encryption Algorithm                             _               _
              _    DES         _ Data Encryption Standard                              _               _
              _    DSM         _ Disconnect Service Message                            _   MCL         _
              _    ECB         _ Electronic Code Book                                  _    DES        _
              _    EFT         _ Electronic Funds Transfer                             _               _
              _     IDK        _ Key Identifier                                        _    CSM        _
              _      ID        _ Identifier                                            _    KDS        _
              _      IP        _ Internet Protocol                                     _               _
              _      IV        _ Initialization Vector                                 _    CSM        _
              _     KA         _ Authentication Key                                    _    CSM        _
              _    KDC         _ Key Distribution Center                               _  CBMS         _
              _    KDS         _ Key Distribution Server                               _  CBMS         _
              _     KD         _ Data-encrypting Key                                   _    CSM        _
              _     KK         _ Key-encrypting Key                                    _    CSM        _
              _    MAC         _ Message Authentication Code                           _    CSM        _
              _    MCL         _ Message Class                                         _    CSM        _
              _     MH         _ The Rand Message Handling System                      _               _
              _    MIC         _ Message Integrity Code                                _    CSM        _
              _     MK         _ Master Key                                            _    CSM        _
              _    MTA         _ Message Transport Agent                               _  CBMS         _
              _    MTS         _ Message Transport System                              _  CBMS         _
              _    ORG         _ Message Originator                                    _    CSM        _
              _    RCV         _ Message Receiver                                      _    CSM        _
              _     RIU        _ Request Identified User                               _   MCL         _
              _     RSI        _ Request Service Initialization                        _   MCL         _
              _     RUI        _ Request User Identification                           _   MCL         _
              _    TCP         _ Transmission Control Protocol                         _               _
              _    TMA         _ Trusted Mail Agent                                    _  CBMS         _
              _     TTI        _ Trusted Technologies, Inc.                            _               _
              ______UA___________User_Agent_______________________________________________CBMS____________


                                                     Table 1

____________________________________Abbreviations_used_in_this_paper__________________________________________________



well-known service host in the ARPA Internet community listens for connections

on a well-known port.5  As each connection is established, it services one or more

transactions over the lifetime of the session.  When all transactions for a session

have been made, the connection is closed.  If the necessary locking operations are

performed by the server to avoid the usual database problems, then more than one

connection may be in progress simultaneously.  Of course, a time-out facility should

________________________________________
5  The term well known in this context means that the location of the service is known a priori to

the clients.
\f Reprinted from Proceedings, Second International Symposium on Computer Message Systems, 1985                8


also be employed to prevent a rogue agent from monopolizing the key distribution

server.


       Once a session has been started, the client (a.k.a. TMA) initiates transactions

with  the  server  (a.k.a.  KDS).  Each  transaction  consists  of  the  exchange  of  two

or  three  cryptographic  service  messages  (CSMs):   the  client  sends  a  request,

the  server  attempts  to  honor  the  request  and  sends  a  response,  and,  if  the

server  responded  positively,  the  client  then  acknowledges  the  transaction.   By

exchanging these cryptographic service messages, the KDS and the TMA are able

to communicate key relationships.  Obviously,  the relationships themselves must

be transmitted in encrypted form.6  Hence, not only are key relationships between

two TMAs communicated,  but key relationships between the KDS and the TMA

are communicated as well.


       This leads us to consider the key relationships that exist between a TMA and

the KDS. A client usually has three keys dedicated for use with the server.  The

first is the master  key (denoted MK), which has an infinite cryptoperiod,  and is

rarely used.  This key is distributed manually.  The second is the key-encrypting key

(denoted KK), which has a shorter cryptoperiod.  Whenever a KK is transmitted

to the TMA, it is encrypted with the master key.  The third is the authentication

key (denoted KA), which is used to authenticate transactions that do not contain

data  keys  (a  count  field  is  also  used  to  avoid  play-back  attacks).   Whenever  a

KA  is  transmitted  to  the  TMA,  it  is  encrypted  with  the  key-encrypting  key.

When transactions contain keys, an associated count field is included to indicate

the  number  of  keys  encrypted  with  the  key-encrypting  key  used.  Although  not

used by the prototype implementation, a production system would employ audit

mechanisms to monitor usage histories.


       Currently four types of requests are honored by the KDS: two key relationship

primitives, and two name service primitives.  The type is indicated by the message

class  (MCL)  of  the  first  cryptographic  service  message  sent  in  the  transaction.

As  each  message  class  is  discussed,  the  appropriate  datastructures  used  by  the

KDS  are  introduced.  Space  considerations  prevent  a  detailed  description  of  the

information exchanged in each transaction.  Appendix B of this paper presents a

short example of an interaction between the KDS and a TMA.


       The first two requests are used to create (or retrieve) key relationships, and

to destroy key relationships:


       The  request  service  initialization  (RSI)  message  class  is  used  to  establish

a  key-encrypting  key  (KK)  relationship  between  the  TMA  and  another  TMA,  or

between the TMA and the KDS. As implied by the name, a key-encrypting key is



________________________________________
6  Otherwise an adversary could simply impersonate a TMA and ask for the desired key relationships.

Similarly, this also prevents an adversary from successfully impersonating a key distribution server.
\f Reprinted from Proceedings, Second International Symposium on Computer Message Systems, 1985                9


used to cipher keys which are used to cipher data exchanged between peers.  These

other keys are called data keys (KDs).


       The disconnect  service  message (DSM) message class is used to discontinue

a KK-relationship between the TMA and another TMA, or between the TMA and

the  KDS.  This  prevents  keys  which  are  felt  to  have  been  compromised,  or  are

vulnerable  to  compromise,  from  receiving  further  use  in  the  system.  It  should

be noted that, owing to mail messages (not CSMs) in transit, a discontinued key

relationship may be needed to decipher the key used to encipher a mail message.

The prototype KDS supports this capability.


       In  addition  to  maintaining  an  MK/KK/KA  triple  for  each  TMA,  the  KDS

also remembers KK-relationships between TMAs.  The reason for this stems from a

fundamental difference between the electronic funds transfer and computer-based

message system worlds.  The KDS assumes that no two arbitrarily chosen TMAs can

communicate in real-time, and as a result, TMAs do not exchange cryptographic

service messages.  (See Appendix C for a more detailed discussion.)  This means

that  when  a  TMA  establishes  a  KK-relationship  with  another  TMA,  the  former

TMA  may  start  using  the  KK  before  the  latter  TMA  knows  of  the  new  KK-

relationship.  In fact, it is quite possible for a KK-relationship to be established,

used, and then discontinued, all unilaterally on the part of one TMA. It is up to

the  KDS  to  retain  old  cryptographic  material  (possibly  for  an  indefinite  period

of time), and aid the latter TMA in reconstructing KK-relationships as the need

arises.  Naturally, discontinued KKs are not used to encode any new information,

but rather to decode old information.  (Again, refer to Appendix C for additional

details.)


       The other two requests are used to query the directory service aspects of the

key distribution server:


       The  request  user  identification  (RUI)  message  class  is  used  to  identify  a

subscriber to the KDS. Both the KDS and TMA are independent of any underlying

mail  transport  system  (MTS).  As  a  result,  a  subscriber  to  the  KDS  is  known

by  two  unique  attributes:  a  "real-world"  name,  and  a  KDS  identifier  (ID).  The

user  of  a  mail  system,  or  the  UA,  is  responsible  for  mapping  an  MTS-specific

address (e.g., MRose@UDEL.ARPA) to the person associated with that maildrop (e.g.,

``Marshall T. Rose''              ).  When conversing with the KDS, the TMA uses the KDS

ID  of  another  user  to  reference  that  person's  TMA.  Since  it  is  inconvenient  to

remember  the  IDs  (as  opposed  to  people's  names),  the  KDS  provides  the  RUI

message  class  to  permit  a  TMA  to  query  the  mapping  between  names  and  IDs.

If the KDS cannot return an exact match, it may respond with a list of possible

matches (if the identifying information given was ambiguous), or it may respond

with a response that there is no matching user.
\f Reprinted from Proceedings, Second International Symposium on Computer Message Systems, 1985              10


       Finally, the request identified user (RIU) message class performs the inverse

operation:  given a KDS ID, a "real-world" name is returned.  This request is useful

for disambiguating unsuccessful RUI requests and in boot-strapping a TMA.


       The KDS maintains two directories:  a private directory and a public directory.

The private directory contains all information on all clients to the KDS. The public

directory  is  a  subset  of  this,  and  is  used  by  the  KDS  when  processing  RUI  and

RIU requests.7  As a result, certain clients of the KDS may have unlisted IDs and

names.



The Trusted Mail Agent

       The prototype version of the TMA was designed to interface directly to the

user  agent  in  order  to  maximize  transparency  to  the  user.  In  present  form,  the

TMA is available as a load-time library under 4.2bsd UNIX, although efforts are

currently underway to transport the TMA to a PC-based environment.


       The software modules which compose the TMA contain a rich set of interfaces

to the KDS. In addition, the TMA manages a local database, so responses from the

KDS may be cached and used at a later time.  In all cases, the KDS is consulted

only if the information is not present in the TMA database, or if the information

in question has expired (e.g., KK-relationships).  This caching activity minimizes

connections to the KDS. Although connections are relatively cheap in the ARPA

Internet, substantial savings are achieved for PCs which contact the KDS over a

public phone network (dial-up) connection.


       The  TMA  performs  mappings  between  pairs  of  the  following  objects:  user

names, KDS IDs, and MTS addresses.  The TMA considers all trusted mail agents,

including itself, as a user name, KDS ID, and one or more MTS addresses.  Although

the  TMA  does  not  interpret  addresses  itself,  in  order  to  simplify  mail  handling,

the TMA remembers the relationship between these objects so the user enters this

information only once.


       Initially, when a TMA is booted, the user supplies it with the master key and

the user's KDS ID. Both of these quantities are assigned by the personnel at the

key distribution center, and subsequently transmitted to the user via an alternate,

bonded service.8  The TMA connects with the KDS and verifies its identity.  From

this point on, the TMA manages its KK-relationships between the KDS and other

TMAs without user intervention.


       The current implementation of the TMA assumes a "general memo framework"

in the context of the Standards for ARPA Internet Text Messages[DCroc82]:



________________________________________
7  In the prototype implementation, the two directories are, for the moment, identical.
8  In this fashion, the problems of boot-strapping over an unsecure medium are avoided.
\f Reprinted from Proceedings, Second International Symposium on Computer Message Systems, 1985              11


           1.  A message consists of two parts:  the headers and the body.  A blank line

               separates the headers from the body.


           2.  Each  (virtual)  line  in  the  headers  consists  of  a  keyword/value  pair,

               in  which  the  keyword  is  separated  from  the  value  by  a  colon  (:).

               The  headers  are  rigorously  structured  in  the  sense  that  they  contain

               addressing and other information useful to a user agent.


           3.  The  body  is  freely  formatted  and  must  not  be  meaningful  to  a  user

               agent.  However,  as  will  be  seen  momentarily,  the  body  of  encrypted

               messages must have an initial fixed format which the TMA enforces.


This  format  is  widely  called  "822"  after  the  number  assigned  to  the  defining

report[DCroc82].9


       To support the cipher activities described below, the TMA contains internal

routines  to  perform  the  following  DES  functions:  electronic  code  book  (ECB)

for  key  encryption,  cipher  block  chaining  (CBC)  for  mail  message  encryption,

checksumming (CKS) for mail message and CSM authentication.  Readers interested

in these different modes of operation for the DES should consult [FIPS81].


Encrypting Mail

       To  encipher  a  message,  the  method  used  is  a  straightforward  adaptation

of the standard encrypting/authentication techniques (though the terminology is

tedious).  Consider the following notation:


     ax (s):   the  checksum  of  the  string  s  using  the  key  x  (DEA  checksumming

               authentication)


  ax+y  (s):   the  checksum  of  the  string  s  using  the  exclusive-or  of  the  two  keys  x

               and y


     ex (y):   the encryption of the key y  using the key x (DEA electronic code book

               encryption)


   ex;y (s):   the encryption of the string s using the key x and initialization vector

               y (DEA cipher block chaining encryption)


           h:  the headers of the message


       and,


           b:  the body of the message



________________________________________
9  Although an 822-style framework is employed by the TMA prototype, the 822 ``Encrypted:''

header  is  not  currently  present  in  encrypted  messages.   This  is  due  to  a  design  decision  which
assumes  that  nothing  in  the  headers  of  a  message  is  sacred  to  the  transport  system,  and  that
"helpful" munging might occur at any time. In the real world, such helpfulness is often a problem.
\f Reprinted from Proceedings, Second International Symposium on Computer Message Systems, 1985              12


For each message to be encrypted, a data key, initialization vector, authentication

key (KD/IV/KA) triple is generated by a random process.  (It goes without saying

that the integrity of the system depends on the process being random).  Then, for

each  user  to  receive  a  copy  of  the  encrypted  message,  the  following  actions  are

taken:


       First,  the  headers  of  the  message  are  output  in  the  clear.  Then,  a  banner

string, i, is constructed and placed at the beginning of the body of the message:


           ENCRYPTED  MESSAGE:  TTI  TMA


which  identifies  the  message  as  being  encrypted  by  the  TTI  TMA.  Following

the  banner  string  is  a  structure,  m,  which  takes  on  the  syntax  and  most  of  the

semantics of a cryptographic service message:


            MCL/      MAIL

            RCV/      rcvid

            ORG/      orgid

             IDK/     kkid

              KD/     ekk (ka)

              KD/     ekk (kd)

               IV/    ekd (iv)

            MIC/      aka (b)

           MAC/       akd+ka   (m)


After  this,  the  encrypted  body  is  output,  ekd;iv (b).  In  short,  the  entire  output

consists of

                                           h + i + m + ekd;iv (b):



       The purpose of the structure m is many-fold.  The MCL field indicates the

structure  m's  type;  currently  only  the  type  MAIL  is  generated  and  understood.

The RCV and ORG fields identify the intended recipient of the message and the

originator.  The IDK field identifies the key-encrypting key, KK, used to encrypt

the next two fields.  The first KD field has the encrypted authentication key, KA,

used  to  calculate  the  MIC  of  the  plaintext  of  the  body  of  the  message.   After

the body of the message is deciphered, aka (b) is calculated and compared to the

value of the MIC field.  Hence, the MIC field authenticates the message body.  The

second KD field has the encrypted data encrypting key, KD, which along with the

encrypted initialization vector in the IV field was used to generate the ciphertext

of the body.  Finally, the MAC field authenticates the m structure itself.  The use

of a data key, initialization vector, authentication key (KD/IV/KA) triple permits

us to perform key distribution in a hierarchical fashion and allows the system to

use a KK-relationship over a longer cryptoperiod without fear of compromise.
\f  Reprinted from Proceedings, Second International Symposium on Computer Message Systems, 1985              13


        The TMA provides three primary interfaces to a UA to send encrypted mail:

 the  first  takes  a  file-descriptor  to  a  message  and  returns  a  structure  g  (called  a

 group) describing the ciphertext version of the body (this structure contains a KD,

 IV,  and  KA  generated  at  random,  along  with  a  file-descriptor  to  the  plaintext

 headers, a file-descriptor to the ciphertext body, and the checksum of the plaintext

 body);  the  second  takes  a  user  entry  (or  MTS  address)  and  g,  and  returns  a

 file-descriptor to the encrypted message for that user (or MTS address); the third

 takes g  and performs clean-up operations.  The chief advantage to this scheme of

 encryption is that if the message is to be sent to more than one recipient, then the

 MIC and the encrypted body need only be calculated once, since the KD, IV, and

 KA  remain  constant  (only  the  KK's  change  with  each  recipient,  hence  for  each

 copy of the encrypted message, only the structure m need be re-calculated).


        There are, however, a few subtleties involved:  first_, the MTS usually accepts

 only 7-bit characters, so the encrypted text is exploded to consist of only printable

 characters;10  second____,  since  the  MTS  may  impose  limits  on  the  length  of  a  line,

 each  line  of  output  is  limited  to  64  characters;  and,  third___,  since  the  body  may

 require  trailing  padding,  during  encryption  one  last  unit  of  8  bytes  is  written

 (and encrypted), naming the number of characters (presently, nulls) padded in the

 previous 8 bytes (0 : : :7).


 Decrypting Mail

        To decipher a message, the method is also straightforward:  The headers are

 output in the clear.  The banner string is essentially ignored, and the structure m

 is consulted to identify the correct key-encrypting key.  The TMA checks to see if

 it knows of that KK. If not,  it asks the KDS to supply it.  From that point,  the

 KA, KD, and IV are deciphered.  The m structure is then authenticated.  With the

 correct key,  the remainder of the body is deciphered,  and all except for the last

 16 bytes are output.  The last 8 bytes indicate how many of the previous 8 bytes

 should be output.  So, the appropriate number of bytes is output, and the plaintext

 body is authenticated and compared to the MIC. Needless to say, as the body is

 deciphered, it is imploded back to 8-bit characters and lines are restored to their

 previous  lengths.  To  indicate  that  the  message  was  correctly  deciphered,  a  new

 header of the form


            X-KDS-ID:  orgid  (originator's  name)


 is appended to the headers of the message.  Note that this provides an authentication

 mechanism.  Note, further, that the UA did not have to know the identity of the

 sender of the message.



 ________________________________________
10  As a rule, in all CSMs, when encrypted information is transmitted, it is exploded after encryption

 by the sender, and imploded prior to decryption by the receiver.
\f  Reprinted from Proceedings, Second International Symposium on Computer Message Systems, 1985              14


 Modifications to MH

        MH  is  a  public  domain  UA  for  UNIX,  which  is  widely  used  in  dealing  with

 both a large number of electronic mail application and a large number of messages.

 Although this document does not intend to describe MH, parts of the system are

 described  as  they  relate  to  the  TMA.  Readers  interested  in  MH  should  consult

 either the user's manual[MRose85a] for a detailed description, or [MRose85d] for a

 higher-level description.


        To modify MH in order to make use of a TMA, three programs were changed

 (with  a  high  degree  of  transparency  to  the  user),  and  two  new  programs  were

 introduced.


        In  MH,  when  a  user  wishes  to  send  a  composed  draft  (which  may  be  an

 entirely new message, a re-distribution of a message, a forwarding of messages, or

 a reply to a message), the user invokes the send program.  This program performs

 some minor front-end work for a program called post which actually interacts with

 the MTS. A new option to the send and post programs, the `-encrypt'        switch, is

 introduced.  If the user indicates


            send -encrypt


 then post encrypts the messages it sends.


        When  sending  an  encrypted  message,  post  first  checks  that  each  addressee

 has a mapping to a KDS ID during address verification.  Then, instead of batching

 all addresses for a message in a single posting transaction, for each addressee, post

 consults  the  TMA  for  the  appropriately  encrypted  text  and  posts  that  instead.

 (Appendix A discusses the reasons for this more fully.)  Hence, assuming the user

 has  established  mappings  between  MTS  addresses  and  KDS  IDs,  the  TMA  does

 all the work necessary to encrypt the message,  including contacting the KDS as

 necessary.11


        In MH, when a user is notified that new mail has arrived, the inc program is

 run.  As each message is incorporated into the user's message handling area, a scan

 (one-line) listing of the message is generated.


        By default, the inc program upon detecting one or more encrypted messages,

 after the scanning process, asks the TMA to decipher the message, and if successful,

 scans the deciphered messages.  This action can be inhibited with the `-nodecrypt'

 switch.  Hence,  if  the  user  wishes  to  retain  messages  in  encrypted  form,  inc  can

 be told to note the presence of encrypted messages, but otherwise not to process

 them.  By using the MH user profile mechanism, inc can be easily customized to

 ________________________________________
11  Once  the  TMA  establishes  a  connection  to  the  KDS,  it  retains  that  connection  until  the  UA

 terminates.  This is done to minimize connections to the KDS. In the context of MH, since the
 trusted mail agent is active over the lifetime of an invocation of a program such as post, this means
 that the connection is terminated just before the program terminates.
\f Reprinted from Proceedings, Second International Symposium on Computer Message Systems, 1985              15


reflect the user's tastes.  Again, the actions of the TMA are transparent to the user.

In fact, if encrypted mail is received from users unknown to the TMA, it queries

the KDS as to their identity prior to retrieving the KK-relationship.


       If  inc  fails  to  decrypt  a  message  for  some  reason,  or  if  inc  was  told  not  to

decrypt a message, the decipher program can be used.  This simple program merely

deciphers each message given in its argument list.  The decipher program can be

given the `-insitu'        switch, which directs it to replace the ciphertext version of

the message with the plaintext version;  or, the `-noinsitu'         switch can be used

indicating that the ciphertext version of the message should be left untouched and

the plaintext version should be listed on the standard output.


       Finally, the tma program is used to manipulate the TMA database, containing

commands to boot the database, add new users to the database, and to establish

mappings between addresses and users in the TMA database.  This program can

also be used to disconnect KKs between other TMAs,  and the KK/KA between

itself and the KDS.


       Appendix A of this paper contains a transcript of an MH session.



Remarks

       We now consider the merit of the system described.  After presenting some

of the basic strengths of the system and a few unresolved questions, the discussion

centers on the simplifying assumptions made by the system, and how these can be

defended in a non-military environment.


Strengths

       It  can  be  argued  that  the  prototype  system  (and  the  augmented  model  in

which it finds its basis) present many strengths.


       Perhaps the most important is the high-level of independence from the MTS

enjoyed  by  the  system.   As  a  result,  since  the  TMA  does  not  interact  directly

with  the  MTS,  it  can  be  made  to  be  completely  free  from  any  MTS-specific

attributes,  such  as  naming,  addressing,  and  routing  conventions.  Furthermore,

when interfacing a Trusted Mail system, no modifications need be made to the MTS

or local MTA.


       In addition to the systems-level advantage to this scheme, users of the system

profit as well, since many disjoint MTSs can be employed by a user with a single

TMA. This reduces the number of weaknesses in the system and allows a user to

keep a single database of "trusted" correspondents.  It should also make analysis

and verification of the TMA easier.


       Of course from the user-viewpoint, once the TMA has been initially booted,

all key management is automatic.  Not only does this reduce the risk of compromise
\f  Reprinted from Proceedings, Second International Symposium on Computer Message Systems, 1985              16


 of  cryptographic  material  (given  proper  construction  and  maintenance  of  the

 TMA), but it relieves the user of a tedious and error-prone task.


        Finally, although the KDS described herein is used to support Trusted Mail,

 other applications which require key management, could employ the services offered

 by the key distribution center.


 Open Questions

        At  present,  there  are  many  restrictions  on  the  prototype  implementation

 described.   Some  of  these  result  from  that  fact  that  the  implementation  is  a

 prototype  and  not  a  production  system.   Others  deal  with  more  fundamental

 issues.


        In terms of the TMA, the expiration delay for keys is hard-wired in; it should

 be user-settable.  In the prototype version, the KK and KA with the KDS are good

 for  2  days  or  10  uses  (whichever  comes  first),  while  a  KK  for  use  with  another

 TMA is good for 1 day or 5 uses.  In actual practice, keys with long cryptoperiods

 might be good for 6 months or 100 uses, while keys with short cryptoperiods might

 be good for 1 month or 25 uses.  The choice of actual values is an open question

 beyond the scope of prototype system.12   In many respects, this issue is a classic

 trade-off:  with  relatively  small  cryptoperiods,  an  adversary  has  less  chance  of

 breaking a key, but with longer cryptoperiods less connections have to be made to

 the key distribution server.


        A  fundamental  issue,  owing  to  differences  between  the  EFT  and  CBMS

 environments, is that the KDS implements only a subset of the ansi draft and the

 semantics of certain operations have changed somewhat.  It would be nice to unify

 the CBMS and EFT views of a key distribution center (in the former environment,

 the center is called a KDC, while in the latter environment,  the center is known

 as  a  CKD).  Appendix  C  of  this  paper  discusses  the  differences  between  the  two

 perspectives in greater detail.


        At  present,  the  relationship  between  errors  in  the  TMA  and  the  posting

 process is an open question.  For example, if an address doesn't have a mapping in

 the TMA database, post treats this as an address verification error.  This prevents

 the draft from being posted.  The philosophy of the UA is unclear at this point,

 with respect to how recovery should occur.  A second area, also in question, deals

 with the way in which plaintext and ciphertext versions of a message are present

 in a system.  Clearly,  it is a bad idea to make both versions available,  but since

 the TMA doesn't try to concern itself with first party observation, there seems to

 be little possibility of preventing this behavior.  The best that can be done, at this

 stage, is simply to choose a consistent policy that user's should attempt to adhere



 ________________________________________
12  The current values were chosen by guess work.  Although not necessarily technically sound, the

 small numbers were very good for debugging purposes.
\f Reprinted from Proceedings, Second International Symposium on Computer Message Systems, 1985              17


to.  The software can help somewhat in implementing this policy, but it certainly

can't circumvent the user.


       The prototype is built on the assumption that a single key distribution server

is present.  Since the ansi draft[FIKM] makes provisions for key translation centers,

the Trusted Mail prototype should perhaps be made to operate in a more diverse

environment.  Until the issues become clearer, this remains open.


       Finally, for distribution lists, a large number of people would need to share

the same KDS ID. The current implementation doesn't support this.  Each TMA

database  is  for  a  particular  ID.  A  user  with  multiple  IDs  would  need  multiple

databases, or the database should be re-organized.


Weaknesses

       As pointed out earlier, this prototype system situates itself in a commercial,

not  military,  environment.   With  respect  to  this  decision,  several  aspects  of

the  system  are  now  discussed,  which  we  feel  are  acceptable  in  a  commercial

environment, but which would be considered weaknesses in a military environment:


   1.  Traffic Flow

       The  prototype  TMA  makes  no  attempt  whatsoever  to  prevent  or  confuse

       traffic analysis by augmenting traffic flow.


   2.  The Database of KDS Subscribers

       Since  information  returned  by  the  request  user  identification  (RUI)  and

       request  identified  user  (RIU)  MCLs  are  returned  in  the  clear,  this  allows

       an  adversary  to  ascertain  subscribers  to  the  KDS,  and  perhaps  deduce

       some information about the system.  Without knowledge of the master key

       however, an adversary could not impersonate a subscriber though.  Still, in

       the  military  sense,  this  is  a  weakness.  However,  all  this  assumes  that  the

       database maintained by the KDS accurately reflects the real-world.


   3.  Multiple Recipients

       It is possible, though not proven to the authors' knowledge, that the scheme

       used to avoid encrypting the body of a message more than once for multiple

       recipients  might  permit  one  of  the  recipients  who  is  also  an  adversary  to

       compromise the key relationship between the sender and another recipient.


       The scenario goes like this:  When a message is being prepared for encryption,

       a single KD/IV/KA triple is generated to encrypt the body.  Since the sender

       has  a  different  key  relationship  with  each  recipient,  each  message  sent  is

       different,  since the structure m depends not only on the KD/IV/KA triple

       but also on the key relation between the sender and a particular recipient.

       Now suppose that one of the recipients, r1 , in addition to receiving the copy

       of  the  message  meant  for  him/her  also  intercepts  a  copy  of  the  message

       destined  for  another  recipient,  r2 .  At  this  point,  the  recipient  r1  has  both
\f Reprinted from Proceedings, Second International Symposium on Computer Message Systems, 1985              18


       the plaintext and ciphertext version of the body, the plaintext version of the

       KD/IV/KA triple, and the ciphertext version of the KD/IV/KA triple that

       was generated using the key relationship between the sender and the recipient

       r2 .  The  question  is:  can  r1  now  deduce  the  key  relationship  between  the

       sender and r2 ?


       If so, then the way that the TMA attempts to minimize the use of encryption

       resources is a weakness.  But,  even if this is possible,  given relatively short

       cryptoperiods  for  key  relationships  between  TMA  peers,  this  becomes  a

       non-problem.


   4.  Discussion Groups

       As discussed earlier, the proposed method of associating a single KDS ID with

       the membership of a discussion group does introduce a significant weakness

       for  the  security  of  messages  sent  to  the  discussion  group.  Since  the  TMA

       does  not  assume  a  general  broadcast  facility,  it  appears  that  there  are  no

       good solutions to the problem of discussion group traffic.  Of course, it is easy

       enough to simply send to each member of the group.


       For  the  sake  of  argument,  let's  assume  that  the  discussion  group  has  n

       members.  Now,  since  a  different  key  relationship  would  exist  between  the

       sender and each of the n recipients,  the structure m would be different for

       each  recipient  and  so  a  different  message  would  have  to  be  sent  to  each

       recipient.  To make matters worse,  if one rejects the way the TMA handles

       multiple  recipients,  not  only  does  the  MTS  get  burdened  with  n  different

       messages, but the sender's TMA gets burdened by having to encrypt the body

       of the message n times.  For meaningful values of n (say on the order of 500,

       or even 25), the amount of resources required for any trusted discussion group

       are simply too costly.


Compromises, Compromises

       Each  of  the  possible  weaknesses  discussed  above  represent  a  compromise

between the expense of the system and the level of security it can provide.


       The  first  two  areas,  if  addressed  by  the  TMA,  could  result  in  much  less

background information being available to an adversary.  In an application where it

is important that an adversary not know who is talking to whom, or who can talk

at all,  this is very important.  It is the authors' position that in the commercial

environment, this issue is not paramount.  By ignoring the issue of traffic flow, the

TMA has a lot less work to do and the MTS is kept clear of "useless" messages.

By keeping the information returned by the RUI and RIU MCLs in the clear, the

complexity of the TMA is significantly reduced.


       The  second  two  areas,  if  addressed  by  the  TMA,  could  result  in  a  lesser

probability  of  traffic  being  deciphered  by  an  adversary.   Regardless  of  the

application,  this  is  always  extremely  important.   However,  the  authors'  feel
\f Reprinted from Proceedings, Second International Symposium on Computer Message Systems, 1985              19


that  the  compromise  made  by  the  TMA  in  these  two  issues  is  not  substantial,

and  does  not  result  in  an  explicit  weakness  when  a  message  is  sent  to  multiple

recipients (note that when there is only a single recipient of a message, these two

policies  can  not  introduce  weaknesses).  In  return,  efficient  use  can  be  made  of

both the MTS and the TMA when messages are being sent to multiple recipients.

Given scarce resources or large numbers of recipients, this approach may prove to

be quite winning.


       Of course, much work remains to be done to prove the success of the TMA in

all four of these areas.



Acknowledgements

       The  prototype  implementation  described  herein  utilizes  a  public  domain

implementation of the DES algorithm[DEA] which was originally implemented by

James J. Gillogly in May, 1977 (who at that time was with the Rand Corporation,

and  is  now  affiliated  with  Gillogly  Software).   Interfaces  to  Dr.  Gillogly's

implementation were subsequently coded by Richard W. Outerbridge in September,

1984 (who at that time was with the Computer Systems Research Institute at the

University of Toronto, and is now affiliated with Perle Systems, Incorporated).


       The  authors  would  like  to  acknowledge  Dennis  Branstad,  Elaine  Barker,

and  David  Balensen  of  the  National  Bureau  of  Standards  for  their  comments

on  the  prototype  system  and  insights  on  the  ANSI  draft[FIKM].  In  particular,

Dr. Branstad originally suggested the method used for encrypting a single message

for multiple recipients under different keys.


       The authors (and all those who have read this paper) would like to thank Willis

H. Ware of the Rand Corporation, and Jonathon B. Postel of the USC/Information

Sciences  Institute.  Their  extensive  comments  resulted  in  a  much  more  readable

paper.  In  addition,  the  authors  would  like  to  thank  Dr.  Stephen  P.  Smith  and

Major Douglas A. Brothers for their insightful comments.
\f Reprinted from Proceedings, Second International Symposium on Computer Message Systems, 1985              20


                                                 References



[DCroc82]        D.H.  Crocker.   Standard  for  the  Format  of  ARPA  Internet  Text

                 Messages.  Request  for  Comments  822.  ARPA  Internet  Network

                 Information Center (NIC), SRI International (August, 1982).



[DEA]            Data  Encryption  Algorithm,  X3.92-1981,  American  National

                 Standards Institute, 1981.



[FIKM]           Financial Institution Key Management, X9.17-198_  (draft), American

                 National Standards Institute, 198_.



[FIPS46]         Data Encryption Standard, Federal Information Processing Standards,

                 Publication 46, 1977.



[FIPS81]         DES Modes of Operation, Federal Information Processing Standards,

                 Publication 81, 1980.



[IP]             Internet  Protocol.  Request  for  Comments  791  (milstd  1777).

                 Appearing in Internet Protocol Transition Workbook, ARPA Internet

                 Network Information Center (NIC), SRI International, 1981.



[LLamp82]        L. Lamport, R. Shostak, M. Pease.  The Byzantine Generals Problem.

                 ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems 4  (July,

                 1982), 382-401.



[MRose85a]       M.T. Rose,  J.L. Romine.  The Rand MH Message Handling System:

                 User's Manual. UCI Version. Department of Information and Computer

                 Science, University of California, Irvine (January, 1985).



[MRose85d]       M.T. Rose, E.A. Stefferud, J.N. Sweet.  MH: A Multifarious User

                 Agent. Computer Networks (to appear).



[TCP]            Transmission Control Protocol. Request for Comments 793 (milstd

                 1778).  Appearing  in  Internet  Protocol  Transition  Workbook,  ARPA

                 Internet Network Information Center (NIC), SRI International, 1981.



[VVoyd83]        V.L.  Voydock,  S.T.  Kent.   Security  Mechanisms  in  High-Level

                 Network Protocols. Computing Surveys 15, 2 (June, 1983), 135-171.



[X.400]          Message  Handling  Systems:   System  Model-Service  Elements,

                 Recommendation  X.400,  International  Telegraph  and  Telephone

                 Consultative Committee (CCITT).
\f  Reprinted from Proceedings, Second International Symposium on Computer Message Systems, 1985              21
 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

  1    %  tma  -add  -user  "UCI  Portal"  uci@udel-dewey
  2    3:  "UCI  Portal"
  3         uci@udel-dewey
  4
  5    %  comp
  6    To:  uci
  7    Fcc:  +outbox
  8    Subject:  test  message
  9    --------
10     mumble,  mumble.
11     ^D
12
13     What  now?  send  -encrypt
14      --  Address  Verification  --
15        --  Local  Recipients  --
16        uci:  address  ok
17      --  Address  Verification  Successful  --
18      --  Posting  for  All  Recipients  --
19        --  Local  Recipients  --
20        uci:  address  ok
21      --  Recipient  Copies  Posted  --
22      --  Filing  Folder  Copies  --
23        Fcc  outbox:  folder  ok
24      --  Folder  Copies  Filed  --
25     Message  Processed


                                                     Figure 4

 __________________________________________Sending_Encrypted_Mail______________________________________________________



 Appendix A: An MH Session

        In  the  following,  the  user  ``Marshall T. Rose''                logged  onto  host

 ``udel-dewey''          , wishes to send a message to a user known as the ``UCI Portal''

 (a system maintenance account).  As shown in Figure 4, line 1, the user first estab-

 lishes a mapping between the name ``UCI Portal''           and the address uci@udel-

 dewey.  Once this mapping is performed, it remains in effect until the user indicates

 otherwise  to  the  TMA.  When  the  tma  program  is  invoked,  it  consults  the  TMA

 database to see if that user is known.  If not,  it contacts the KDS to ask for the

 KDS ID associated with the user.  If the response is successful (in this case,  the

 KDS ID is ``3''    ), then the TMA updates its database.  The tma program indicates

 in its output the KDS ID associated with the user, along with all known addresses

 (in this case, only one).  So, once the name to address mapping has been described

 the user, the user agent, MH, deals only with the address, while the trusted mail

 agent deals with the name and KDS ID aspects of the user.


        Next, the comp program is invoked to compose a new draft on line 5.  The

 user addresses the local user ``uci''      in the To:  field, and indicates that a plaintext

 copy  should  be  kept  in  the  folder  ``+outbox''       .  After  entering  the  subject  and

 text of the draft,  the user enters What  now?  level on line 13.  At this point,  the
\f Reprinted from Proceedings, Second International Symposium on Computer Message Systems, 1985              22
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

 1    %  inc
 2    Incorporating  new  mail  into  inbox...
 3
 4        1+E02/28  0227-EST  mrose                   test  message   <<ENCRYPTED  MESSAGE:  TTI
 5
 6    Incorporating  encrypted  mail  into  inbox...
 7
 8        1+  02/28  0227-EST  mrose                   test  message   <<mumble,  mumble.  >>


                                                    Figure 5

________________________________________Receiving_Encrypted_Mail______________________________________________________



user  directs  MH  to  send  the  draft  in  encrypted  form.   The  resulting  output  is

verbose (a default for send for this user) but instructive.  Initially, all addresses in

the draft are verified on lines 14 to 17.  Two forms of verification occur:  first, the

MTS is asked to verify the address as much as possible.  For local addresses, the

MTS decides if the name has a maildrop associated with it.  For remote addresses,

the MTS decides if the host is known to it.  The second type of verification occurs

with the TMA. For all addresses, the TMA is asked if it can find a mapping from

the address to a KDS ID.


       The  reason  MH  goes  to  all  this  trouble  is  a  philosophical  issue.  Since  the

copy of the encrypted draft is different for each recipient, post tries to verify that

all  recipients  can  be  successfully  posted  prior  to  actually  posting  the  different

ciphertext versions of the draft.  This behavior is not optimal in terms of cycles,

but is perhaps "correct" from a UA perspective.


       Finally, the draft is actually posted, and the folder carbon-copy is filed.


       Some time later, the UCI portal is informed that new mail has arrived.  As

shown  in  Figure  5,  the  inc  program  is  run.  The  ``E''    prior  to  the  date  of  the

message indicates that inc has detected the message to be encrypted.  Since the

user did not inhibit inc from deciphering the message, it proceeds to do so.


       Finally,  it  may  be  instructive  to  see  what  the  encrypted  message  looked

like  when  it  was  delivered  to  the  portal's  maildrop,  and  the  final  message  after

deciphering.  Figures 6 and 7 show these respectively.  In particular, note that the

``X-KDS-ID:''          field has been introduced in Figure 7 after successfully deciphering

the message.  The presence of this field authenticates the sender of the message.
\f Reprinted from Proceedings, Second International Symposium on Computer Message Systems, 1985              23
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Received:  From  localhost.DELAWARE  by  udel-dewey.DELAWARE  id  a022713
              ;28  Feb  85  2:27  EST
To:  uci@udel-dewey
Subject:  test  message
Date:  28  Feb  85  02:27:16  EST  (Thu)
Message-ID:  <4057.478423636@udel-dewey>
From:  mrose@udel-dewey


ENCRYPTED  MESSAGE:  TTI  TMA
(
MCL/MAIL
RCV/3
ORG/17
IDK/850228072730
KD/e36813a3882eebd1
KD/fa8b8ac657476669
IV/Ef9d283565431b103
MIC/fdb927fb
MAC/50e9de30
)
a13774f652d844762c4fc03c2f4e201b9d2f57eadb00546c


                                                    Figure 6

______________________________________Message_Prior_to_Decryption_____________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Received:  From  localhost.DELAWARE  by  udel-dewey.DELAWARE  id  a022713
              ;28  Feb  85  2:27  EST
To:  uci@udel-dewey
Subject:  test  message
Date:  28  Feb  85  02:27:16  EST  (Thu)
Message-ID:  <4057.478423636@udel-dewey>
From:  mrose@udel-dewey
X-KDS-ID:  17  (Marshall  T.  Rose)


mumble,  mumble.


                                                    Figure 7

________________________________________Message_After_Decryption______________________________________________________



Appendix B: A Short Exchange

       The simple nature of the interchange between the user and MH in Appendix A

completely hides any interactions between the TMA and the KDS. Let us briefly

examine  an  exchange  that  might  occur  after  the  destination  TMA  receives  the

message shown in Figure 6.


       To  begin,  the  TMA  must  ascertain  what  it  knows  about  the  sender  of  the

message,  which  claims  to  have  a  KDS  ID  of  17.   That  is,  the  TMA  must  first

consider what key relationships it has with the sender.  For the sake of argument,
\f  Reprinted from Proceedings, Second International Symposium on Computer Message Systems, 1985              24
 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

  1    <---  (
  2    <---  MCL/RIU
  3    <---  RCV/17
  4    <---  ORG/3
  5    <---  KDC/TTI
  6    <---  EDC/1a1fbbba
  7    <---  )
  8    --->  (
  9    --->  MCL/RTR
10     --->  RCV/17
11     --->  ORG/3
12     --->  CTA/1
13     --->  USR/"Marshall  T.  Rose"
14     --->  KDC/TTI
15     --->  MAC/2ebde134
16     --->  EDC/96b183de
17     --->  )
18     <---  (
19     <---  MCL/ACK
20     <---  RCV/17
21     <---  ORG/3
22     <---  KDC/TTI
23     <---  EDC/59a8ddcc
24     <---  )


                                                     Figure 8

 __________________________________________Ascertaining_the_Sender_____________________________________________________



 suppose that this purported subscriber is unknown to the TMA. In this case, the

 first step it must undertake is to ascertain the validity of this subscriber.


        As  shown  in  Figure  8  on  lines  1-7,  the  TMA  does  this  by  establishing  a

 connection  to  the  KDS  and  issuing  an  request  identified  user  (RUI)  MCL.13  If

 the response by the KDS is positive,  the TMA will use the information returned

 when generating the ``X-KDS-ID:''           field for authentication.  The response CSM

 returned  by  the  KDS  includes  an  authentication  checksum  (the  MAC  field  on

 line 15) and a transaction count (the CTA field on line 12) to prevent spoofing by a

 process pretending to be the KDS. The TMA then acknowledges that the response

 from the server was acceptable on lines 18-24.


        The next step is to ascertain the actual key relationship used to encrypt the

 structure  m,  which  appears  after  the  identifying  string.  The  TMA  consults  the


 ________________________________________
13  In point of fact, the very first thing that the TMA does after connecting to the KDS is verify

 that  the  key  relationships  between  the  KDS  and  the  TMA  are  valid  (have  not  expired).   If  the
 key relationship between the two has expired, the TMA issues a request service initialization RSI
 MCL to establish a new key relationship. This relationship contains a key-encrypting key (KK) and
 an authentication key (KA). Once a valid key relationship exists between the KDS and the TMA,
 transactions concerning other key relationships may take place.
\f  Reprinted from Proceedings, Second International Symposium on Computer Message Systems, 1985              25
 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

  1    <---  (
  2    <---  MCL/RSI
  3    <---  RCV/17
  4    <---  ORG/3
  5    <---  IDK/850228072730
  6    <---  KDC/TTI
  7    <---  SVR/KD.IV.KK
  8    <---  EDC/83679e14
  9    <---  )
10     --->  (
11     --->  MCL/RTR
12     --->  RCV/17
13     --->  ORG/3
14     --->  KK/095f9d6b87f57871
15     --->  CTA/2
16     --->  KD/527fbb5593efd318
17     --->  KD/1dcab338be1e7a09
18     --->  IV/E02db5e598b2823ae
19     --->  EDK/850618075332
20     --->  KDC/TTI
21     --->  MAC/12cbbdf5
22     --->  EDC/8cd0c4a8
23     --->  )
24     <---  (
25     <---  MCL/ACK
26     <---  RCV/17
27     <---  ORG/3
28     <---  KDC/TTI
29     <---  EDC/59a8ddcc
30     <---  )


                                                     Figure 9

 __________________________________Ascertaining_the_Key_Relationship___________________________________________________



 IDK field in m, and if this relationship is unknown to it, then the KDS is asked to

 disclose the key relationship.


        As shown in Figure 9 on lines 1-9, This is done by issuing a request service

 initialization (RSI) MCL and specifying the particular key relationship of interest.

 The  KDS  consults  its  database,  and  if  the  exact  key  relationship  between  the

 two  indicated  TMAs  can  be  ascertained,  it  returns  this  information.   The  key

 relationship  is  encrypted  using  the  key  relationship  between  the  KDS  and  the

 TMA, and the usual count and authentication fields are included.


        Once the TMA knows the key relationship used to encrypt the structure m,

 it can decider the structure and ascertain the KD/IV/KA triple used to encrypt

 the body of the message.
\f  Reprinted from Proceedings, Second International Symposium on Computer Message Systems, 1985              26


 Appendix C: Differences between the ANSI and TTI drafts

        The differences between the ansi draft standard for financial institution key

 management,  and  the  TTI  draft's  specification  for  trusted  mail  handling,  are

 considered.


        The concept of a key distribution center (CKD in the ansi draft, KDC in the

 TTI  draft) environment differs.  In the ansi draft, only one party talks to the key

 distribution  server  (KDS);  in  the  TTI  draft,  both  parties  talk  to  the  KDS.  This

 leads  to  a  number  of  differences  in  the  two  protocols.  The  reason  for  this  shift

 in the TTI  draft is somewhat subtle:  although both parties can talk to the KDS,

 the mail transfer system (MTS) environment is such that both user agents (UAs)

 are unable to contact each other in real-time.  Hence, a detailed two-way protocol

 between them is prohibitively expensive.14


        Before discussing the differences between the two drafts, let us consider the

 differences in the two environments:  in the electronic mail environment, the two

 end-to-end  peers  need  not  be  simultaneously  online.  Electronic  mail  relies  on  a

 communication  service  with  potentially  large  delays  in  transit  between  message

 transfer agents (MTAs).  A basic concept of "mail" is that an originator must release

 the enveloped message to a "transfer agent" before delivery can be attempted to a

 recipient.  In contrast, in the electronic funds environment, the two peers make use

 of a virtual-circuit service.  This means that they can synchronize much easier and

 inter-operate in a more direct fashion.


        Service protocols are based on the notion of requests and responses.  A client

 issues a request to a server, the server processes the request and returns a response.

 Depending on the complexity of the protocol, the client may now respond to the

 server's message, or might issue a new request, or might terminate the connection.


        As  delays  in  the  network  increase,  along  with  the  possibility  of  loss  or

 corruption  or  re-ordering  of  messages,  it  becomes  more  difficult  to  implement  a

 service  protocol.   In  the  case  of  a  high-level  protocol  making  use  of  a  virtual-

 circuit service, most problems can be ignored, as the virtual-circuit service masks

 out  problems  in  the  network  by  using  sequences,  positive  (and/or  negative)

 acknowledgments, windows, and so on.


        Sadly,  electronic  mail  cannot  utilize  a  virtual-circuit  throughout  the  MTS

 (although individual MTA-wise connections are (in theory) virtual-circuit based).

 This means that implementing a real-time or interactive service protocol between

 two endpoints (a.k.a. UAs) in the MTS is very difficult.  As a result, the complexity

 of  an  end-to-end  protocol  in  the  MTS  (in  terms  of  requests  and  responses)  is

 severely  constrained.  For  all  practical  purposes,  an  MTA  can  assume  datagram

 service and nothing else:  messages might be re-ordered; messages might not reach

 ________________________________________
14  In the words of Einar A. Stefferud:  "Every interesting connection has at least two end-points _

 connections with only one end-point are always uninteresting."
\f Reprinted from Proceedings, Second International Symposium on Computer Message Systems, 1985              27


their destination; messages might be corrupted (though this is unlikely); in cases

of failure, a notice might be generated, or might not.


       In terms of the environment in which cryptographic service messages (CSMs)

must flow, the high degree of delay and uncertainty make the implementation of a

complex end-to-end protocol between UAs prohibitively expensive.  Hence, a KDC

is needed, to which each UA can connect using a virtual-circuit service, at posting

and  delivery  time.  The  TTI  draft  terms  such  a  user  agent  a  trusted  mail  agent

(TMA). Since both TMAs can connect to the KDS at different times using different

media, the KDS maintains state information about the key relationships between

different TMAs and manages those relationships appropriately.  Since connections

to the KDS can be expensive in terms of resources, each TMA caches information

received from the KDS appropriately.


       That's the gist of the argument as to why the TTI  draft differs from the ansi

draft.  It might be possible to include CSMs in the messages which UAs exchange,

but management of these CSMs can not be done reliably or in a straightforward

fashion owing to the datagram nature of the service offered by the MTS. Finally, it

should be noted that in the TTI  draft, the KDS never initiates a connection with

a TMA, rather it is the TMAs which connect to the KDS.


       In the following, the differences between the two drafts are highlighted.  Minor

differences between the two are not discussed.


       In the ansi draft, x 4:2 (p. 22) discusses the requirements for the automated

key management architecture.  The TTI  draft has somewhat more "depth", since

the  ansi  draft  does  not  make  use  of  a  master  key  (MK)  to  fully  automate  the

distribution of key-encrypting keys (KK).


       The ansi draft states that once a KK-relationship is discontinued by either

of  that  pair,  the  relation  is  not  to  be  re-used  for  any  subsequent  activity.  This

can't be guaranteed in the prototype implementation.  If one of the TMAs wishes

to discontinue a key, not only does it have to inform the KDS, but the other TMA

as well.  Since the TTI  draft does not permit CSMs between TMA-peers, the latter

action doesn't seem possible.  However, there is a solution.  Whenever a message is

deciphered, the TMA checks the effective date of the key used to encrypt a message

it has received, and if the key is newer than the one it currently uses, it considers

the older key to be discontinued.


       Furthermore,  although  the  environment  in  the  TTI  draft  is  that  of  a  key

distribution center, the notion of an ultimate recipient is not present, since all clients

connect to the KDS at one time or another.  In addition, the differences between

the  environs  envisioned  by  the  two  drafts  become  even  more  pronounced  when

one considers that the KDS distributes key-encrypting keys to TMAs, although the

ansi draft specifically prohibits this.
\f Reprinted from Proceedings, Second International Symposium on Computer Message Systems, 1985              28


       Finally,  there  is  another  important  technical  difference  between  the  two

drafts:  every  request  to  the  KDS  by  the  TMA  results  in  a  specifically  defined

response from the KDS to the TMA. Furthermore, if the KDS responds in a positive

manner, then the TMA acknowledges this.  This three-way interaction is used to

ensure consistency between the states of the KDS and the TMA. The ansi draft

does not require such behavior, and might profit from some finite-state analysis to

ascertain unsafe (in terms of correctness) states which are reachable.
\f



                                                   Contents



                                                                                                               Page

 Introduction .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  *
 *.        1

 The Key Distribution Service  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .        6

 The Trusted Mail Agent  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .      10

        Encrypting Mail .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .      11

        Decrypting Mail .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .      13

 Modifications to MH  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .      14

 Remarks .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . *
 * .      15

        Strengths  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .*
 *      15

        Open Questions  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .      16

        Weaknesses .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   *
 *   17

        Compromises, Compromises.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .      18

 Acknowledgements .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .      19

 References .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . *
 * .      20

 Appendix A: An MH Session  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .      21

 Appendix B: A Short Exchange .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .      23

 Appendix C: Differences between the ANSI and TTI drafts  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .      26



 ________________________________________
This document (version #2.60) was TEXset April 12, 1990 with DISS.STY v103.



                                                                                                                     i